INTRODUCTION
The 2009 pandemic H1N1 virus (H1N1pdm09) represents the best-documented emergence of a swine pathogen in humans, particularly as the virus was associated with widespread global morbidity, mortality and years of life lost in humans (Viboud et al., 2010) . The H1N1pdm09 virus was generated by a reassortment event between Eurasian swine H1N1 influenza viruses and North American triplereassortant H1 viruses, with the former contributing the N1 and M segments and the latter donating the PB2, PB1, PA, H1, NP and NS segments (Garten et al., 2009) . Although similar influenza virus reassortants containing segments of both Eurasian swine virus and triple-reassortant swine virus origins have been detected in Asia Smith et al., 2009) , no 'smoking gun' viruses that are closely related progenitors have been detected in swine in any locality.
Following the identification of H1N1pdm09 in humans in April 2009, the virus was transmitted rapidly from humans back into swine. The first isolation of a H1N1pdm09 virus in swine was from a pig farm in Alberta, Canada, in May 2009 (Howden et al., 2009) , and the H1N1pdm09 virus was subsequently isolated from outbreaks in swine in all other major continents: Africa (Njabo et al., 2012) , Asia (Kim et al., 2011; Sreta et al., 2010) , Australia (Holyoake et al., 2011) , Europe (Hofshagen et al., 2009; Howard et al., 2011) and South America (Pereda et al., 2010) . Upon introduction into the swine population, H1N1pdm09 viruses co-circulated with endemic swine influenza viruses and exchanged genome segments via reassortment (Ducatez et al., 2011; Lam et al., 2011; Vijaykrishna et al., 2010) . In 2011, 12 reassortant H3N2 (H3N2v) swine influenza viruses with matrix (M) segments of pandemic H1N1pdm09 origin were isolated from humans in the USA (CDC, 2012) .
Seasonal human influenza viruses have also been isolated periodically from swine, with a few major lineages becoming endemic in swine: most notably the human-origin H3N2 viruses that proliferated in European swine in the 1970s (Ottis et al., 1982) , the H1d lineage of human origin that emerged in North American swine in 2003 (Karasin et al., 2006) , and the human H3, N2 and PB1 segments that were associated with the triple-reassortant viruses that were identified in 1998 in North American swine (Zhou et al., 1999) . In addition, singletons and smaller clusters of swine influenza viruses that contain one or more segments of human seasonal influenza virus origin have been identified in several countries, including Argentina Pereda et al., 2011) and Italy (Moreno et al., 2012 Mar 2010  3  98  32  China  May 2010  10  100  33  USA  IL  May 2010  3  92d  97  34  Thailand  Sep 2010  2  100  80  35  Costa Rica  Nov 2010  6  100  100  36  Cuba  Nov 2010  3  98d  100  37  Thailand  Nov 2010  2  99  38 USA IA, IL Nov-Dec 2010 3 98 97d
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The increased global surveillance of influenza in pigs provides the first opportunity to estimate the extent of humanto-swine transmission of the H1N1pdm09 virus. The main aim of our study was therefore to estimate, using a simple phylogenetic approach, the total number of introductions of the H1N1pdm09 virus from humans into swine using a dataset of H1N1pdm09 viruses collected globally in swine during 2009-2011. We then compared this estimate with the equivalent transmission frequency of human seasonal (non-pandemic) H1 and H3 into swine since 1990. Frequency of human-to-swine transmission of seasonal influenza viruses Across the H1, H3, N1 and N2 phylogenies, at least 23 separate introductions of seasonal influenza virus from humans to swine were observed during the period 1990 . The vast majority of these introductions were identified after 1996, when surveillance of influenza virus in swine increased. Six human-to-swine transmission events involved the human seasonal H1 segment, eight involved the human H3 segment, six involved the human N1 segment and 16 involved the human N2 segment ( Table 2 ). The higher number of introductions of the human N2 segment is DBoxes that are empty indicate that no sequences were available for these genome segments or that bootstrap support was ,70
RESULTS
%.
dBootstrap support was ¢70 %, but only for a subset of the isolates in a given cluster.
Human-to-swine transmission of influenza virus probably related to several factors, including (a) the overall higher number of H3N2 virus introductions (n512) due to the dominance of the H3N2 subtype in humans during the period of this study, (b) the frequency of introductions (n53) of the human H1N2 variant that circulated globally in humans from 2001 to 2003, and (c) the frequency of reassortment involving N2 segments of human origin and HA segments of swine origin. For example, the 20 H1N2 reassortant viruses from Italy that are associated with introduction #11 have N2 sequences that are related most closely to the N2 of human seasonal H3N2 isolates collected in 1997-1998, but H1 sequences related to European swine influenza viruses.
Twelve of the introductions of seasonal influenza virus were first identified in Asia, six were first identified in the USA, three in Canada and two in Europe ( Table 2) . As with the H1N1pdm09 viruses, the methods that we used to define a human-to-swine transmission event are highly conservative, and numerous probable introductions were excluded from our final estimate, particularly those involving singletons. Six singleton swine isolates, including three from Argentina, which were identified to be of human origin on both the HA and NA trees but were not supported by high bootstrap values, are highlighted (letters a-g, Table 2 ; Figs S4-S7). Additionally, eight swine H3N2 isolates collected in Hong Kong during 2000-2002 are interspersed with human isolates collected from that same time period on both the H3 and N2 phylogenies, suggesting additional introductions of human H3N2 viruses into swine in Hong Kong, although again lacking the phylogenetic resolution required to be defined as discrete introductions.
Estimated time periods of human-to-swine transmission
The long branch lengths associated with several introductions of human-origin influenza viruses into swine indicate 
Spatial patterns of human-origin influenza viruses in swine
The number of swine H1N1pdm09 isolates associated with each introduction (ranging from one to ten isolates; Table 1 ) represents the extent of onward swine-to-swine transmission that can be inferred from our phylogenetic analysis. Although the vast majority of introductions of human H1N1pdm09 viruses into swine exhibit local onward transmission in pigs, reflected in introductions that are associated with more than one swine isolate, we infer that global viral movement has not yet been important in the dissemination of the H1N1pdm09 virus in swine. Specifically, each cluster of swine H1N1pdm09 influenza viruses that are associated with a human-to-swine transmission event is highly spatially structured, with no swine introduction including viruses collected in more than one country. However, within-country spread of H1N1pdm09 viruses has occurred in the USA, as six viral US introductions include multiple states, representing viral dissemination within the Midwestern USA (Table 1) . Limited spread within Canada between Alberta and Manitoba was also detected (introduction # 2; Table 1 ). Within-country spread was not observed in other countries where information on the province or region of viral collection was also available, including China and Australia.
Similarly, 18 of the 23 introductions of human seasonal H1 and H3 influenza viruses into swine involve a single country ( Table 2) . Six of these single-country introductions involve singleton swine influenza viruses, with no evidence of onward transmission. In contrast, four viral introductions include isolates collected in different countries, indicating viral migration within North America and into and within Asia. Aside from the major introduction of triple-reassortant H3N2 viruses that spread from North America to Asia (introduction # 4) and from the USA to Canada (introduction # 10), possible limited viral migration occurred between Taiwan and Indonesia (introduction #9) and the USA and South Korea (introduction #8).
DISCUSSION
Despite evolving the capability to transmit efficiently in humans, our results indicate that the H1N1pdm09 influenza virus has retained its ability to transmit back into swine and to co-circulate with other swine influenza viruses, increasing genetic diversity and providing the opportunity for reassortment. The large number of H1N1pdm09 transmission events observed in this study, even using conservative methods, highlights the frequency of human-swine contact rates globally and the continual exposure of swine to human influenza viruses. Indeed, this transmission rate is considerably higher than would be inferred from the relatively lower number (n523) of human-to-swine transmission events of seasonal H1 and H3 influenza viruses that were identified during the past two decades. Importantly, detection of seasonal human influenza viruses in swine did not increase during 2009-2011, despite widespread global circulation of seasonal H3N2 viruses in humans during [2010] [2011] . Hence, the different transmission frequencies observed are not explained by the increase in swine influenza surveillance since 2009 and are unlikely to be an artefact of sampling. Furthermore, the low phylogenetic resolution of the H1N1pdm09 phylogeny, due to the virus's recent emergence and relatively low genetic diversity, impeded the identification of what are likely to be many more introductions of this virus into swine than could be defined here.
Although it is tempting to compare the frequencies of human-to-swine transmission with the 27 swine-origin influenza viruses that were identified in humans in the USA over a time period similar to that of our study (1990 ( -2010 ( ) (Shu et al., 2012 , such a comparison is biased greatly by the substantially higher levels of global surveillance of M. I. Nelson and others influenza in humans than consistently occurs in swine. However, the intensity of influenza surveillance in humans does facilitate estimation of the time of emergence of the 23 introductions of human seasonal influenza viruses into swine. For example, the introductions of H1N1pdm09 viruses were generally detected in swine within 1 year, whereas several of the human seasonal influenza viruses that were introduced into swine were not detected for 5-10 years. Whilst the time to detection in swine may relate to intrinsic viral characteristics (e.g. the virus must first adapt, then replicate competently in the new host, then spread to many hosts before being detected), it is also possible that the difference in time between when a human-to-swine transmission event is detected in swine and the year of collection of the most closely related human influenza viruses provides an indication of intensity of swine surveillance in a given region. The smallest gaps in detection are in Canada, the USA and Hong Kong, where ongoing viral surveillance is conducted in swine, while larger time gaps occurred in countries such as South Korea, Italy, Thailand and Argentina, where sampling appears to be more sporadic, based on publicly available sequence data.
The global frequency of introductions of H1N1pdm09 viruses into swine also provides an opportunity to track, in detail, the onward transmission and spatial dissemination of these new viral clades and how they relate to swine movements (Nelson et al., 2011) . It will be particularly important to determine which of these H1N1pdm09 lineages sustains transmission in swine over the long term, to observe their population dynamics in a new swine host and to identify which lineages spread globally. The multiple introductions of human influenza viruses into swine provide a natural experiment for observing adaptive evolution of influenza from human to swine hosts, in identifying instances of parallel adaptive evolution, and in the comparison of rates of evolutionary change and selection pressures along the branches that define human-to-swine transmission events. Clearly, the ability to trace such dynamics relies upon the continued surveillance of influenza in swine globally, even after the initial interest in the 2009 H1N1 pandemic has subsided.
METHODS
Sequence data used in this study. To estimate the number of human-to-swine transmission events of the H1N1pdm09 virus, we compiled gene sequence data from 263 H1N1pdm09 influenza viruses that were collected in swine during 2009-2011 in 18 countries: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Cameroon, Canada, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Hong Kong, Japan, Mexico, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, the UK and the USA (Table S1 ). Due to the frequency of reassortment between H1N1pdm09 viruses and other swine influenza viruses involving the HA and NA segments, concatenated internal gene segments (PB2, PB1, PA, NP, M and NS) and the HA and NA segments were studied separately. Separate phylogenies were also inferred for each of the internal gene segments to identify and remove any viruses with reassorted internal genes. As background data, 1008 complete genome sequences from H1N1pdm09 influenza viruses that were collected in humans during 2009-2011 were downloaded from the Influenza Virus Resource on GenBank; due to the size of the original dataset (n52718 genomes), 50 genome sequences were selected randomly from highly sampled countries (i.e. those with .50 genome sequences) (Bao et al., 2008) .
To identify swine influenza viruses related to human seasonal H1 and H3 influenza viruses, four phylogenetic trees were inferred using all full-length H1 (n5991, excluding pandemic viruses), H3 (n5326), N1 (n5858) and N2 (n5559) sequences collected from swine since 1990 that are available in GenBank (accession numbers are available from the authors). Due to the frequency of reassortment and low availability of whole-genome sequence data for these swine viral isolates, alignments of the concatenated internal genome segments were not included for this part of the study. These data came from Argentina, Belgium, Canada, China, Denmark, France, Germany, Hong Kong, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Spain, South Korea, Sweden, Taiwan, Thailand, the UK and the USA. From these phylogenies, 152 human-origin swine H1 sequences, 221 human-origin swine H3 sequences, 18 human-origin swine N1 sequences and 430 humanorigin swine N2 sequences were identified globally and used in the final analysis. This analysis also included, as background data, 1000 randomly selected human seasonal H1, H3, N1 and N2 segments collected from 1990 to 2011. A large clade of European sequences (e.g. A/sw/Scotland/410440/1994) that were of human seasonal H1 virus origin were not included because they clearly were introduced from humans into swine at least a decade prior to 1990, the beginning of our study period.
To identify any additional human-to-swine transmission events that could not be detected from trees inferred with full-length HA sequence data, two additional phylogenies were inferred using all partial HA1 sequence data (918 nt) from the swine H1 (n51200 sequences) and H3 (n51290 sequences) subtypes available since 1990, including HA1 sequence data from the same 1000 human influenza viruses that were selected as background in the full-length HA phylogenies. Using HA1 data, we identified 50 additional swine H1 sequences of human origin and 70 additional swine H3 sequences of human origin. However, all but two isolates [A/sw/Obihiro/3/ 1993(H3N2) and A/sw/Obihiro/1/1994(H3N2)] were associated with introductions that are already identified in the analysis of full-length HA and NA sequences.
Phylogenetic analysis of H1N1pdm09. Alignments were constructed manually using the Se-Al program (Rambaut, 2002) for three sets of swine H1N1pdm09 virus sequence data, with the 1008 human H1N1pdm09 isolates included as background: (i) the HA segment [n5232 swine H1N1pdm09 isolates, 199 of which were downloaded from GenBank, and 33 provided by the University of Minnesota Veterinary Diagnostic Laboratory (UMVDL) from samples collected from their routine veterinary diagnostic laboratory submission and/or tested via the US Department of Agriculture (USDA) National Animal Health Laboratory Network (NAHLN) Swine Influenza Surveillance System]; (ii) the NA segment (n5229 swine H1N1pdm09 isolates, 197 from GenBank and 32 from UMVDL); and (iii) concatenated internal gene segments (n5100 swine H1N1pdm09 isolates, all downloaded from GenBank, with all reassortants identified from individual gene trees and excluded). For each alignment, a maximum-likelihood (ML) tree was inferred using the PhyML v3.0 program (Guindon et al., 2010) , employing SPR (subtree pruning and regrafting) branch-swapping and a general time-reversible model (GTR) model of nucleotide substitution with gamma-distributed rate variation among sites. Statistical support for individual nodes was estimated using 1000 replicate neighbour-joining trees inferred using PAUP* and assuming the GTR+gamma model of nucleotide substitution (Swofford, 2003) . Well-supported nodes (¢70 % bootstrap support) defining human-to-swine viral introductions were identified visually on each phylogeny. To mitigate possible effects of sequencing Human-to-swine transmission of influenza virus error, the several isolates that were separated by extremely long branch lengths were only categorized as discrete introductions when multiple isolates from the same country exhibited the same phylogenetic pattern.
Phylogenetic analysis of seasonal H1 and H3. Alignments were manually constructed using Se-Al for four sets of swine influenza virus sequences that were identified as of human seasonal (nonpandemic) influenza virus origin: (i) 152 H1 sequences, (ii) 221 H3 sequences, (iii) 18 N1 sequences and (iv) 430 N2 sequences. As background, 1000 human influenza viruses were selected randomly for each segment and downloaded from GenBank. For each alignment, an ML tree was inferred as described above to identify well-supported nodes (¢70 % bootstrap support) defining introductions of influenza viruses from humans to swine. The estimated time periods of human-to-swine transmission were inferred directly from the phylogeny by identifying the most closely related human viruses (the sampling date of which is known). This simple phylogenetic method produced results (i.e. times to common ancestry) similar to those obtained using the Bayesian Markov chain Monte Carlo approach available in the BEAST program (Drummond & Rambaut, 2007) and performed during a previous analysis of human influenza viruses that were transmitted to swine (Nelson et al., 2011) .
